Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the

panelists for your presentations, your thoughtfulness. Several of

you I have had in front of panels where we were going through this

exercise I believe 4 years ago looking at Iraq.

I want to go at one narrow question, one broad question. Several

years ago, when we were looking at regime change, that was the

terminology that was developed at the time on the Iraq Liberation

Act, supporting outside groups, what we could do to remove Saddam

Hussein, there was broad consensus that this is a bad actor,

Saddam Hussein, we would be better off if he was not there, is now

the time, and what are the means, and that is the same question

we are here with today.

One of the issues that came up at that time was, it would not

be a containment plus strategy as you described it, but one was described

as saying we have a no-fly policy over certain portions of

Iraq today that Saddam cannot enter air space, and we will enforce

that. It was to expand that policy to a no-fly, no-drive policy, and

try to allow opposition forces to buildup in further areas of Iraq,

Kurds already control a good portion of the north, try to expand

that in the south, and to have Saddam become more of a mayor of

Baghdad than controlling the entire country.

I would like, perhaps if we could, one of the military members

respond to the thoughts of trying to do something like that today,

and whether or not you feel like that is a meritorious type of policy trend to support.

On the ground?

Just with air superiority, using air superiority?

Thank you for directly responding. The second

is a broader question. It may be a bit of a wild card, but it

struck me as an interesting point. A gentleman far more knowledgeable

than I am on these issues in the region was assessing the

war on terrorism—and I think to date the Bush administration has

done a marvelous job in the war on terrorism.

I think they have been so very focused, very intense, and going

sequentially, focused on Afghanistan. Next, they have been involved

in the Philippines where the troops are coming out, Georgia,

troops in Uzbekistan, building alliances up in Central Asia. I think

this has been to me a very good, solid, sequential strategy.

My question is now that in the war on terrorism, what is the appropriate

next target to go at? If you just back up and you ask

yourself, what is the best place to go at, and this person was asserting

that if you look at it that way, and you are trying to get

your biggest, most problematic targets first, an analogy to dealing

with cancer, where you go and you dig the big nodes out before

they metastasize, you go at Afghanistan, you have got to dig and

pull this one out, that your next big country that is supporting and

sponsoring terrorism, that is putting money into it, that is putting

troops into it, that is training, is Iran, that that is the country that

is supporting, that is sponsoring more terrorism, supporting Islam

Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, shipping weapons, providing training to

a number of countries in that region. Is that the more likely intense

focus that one should go at in a sequential battle in the war on terrorism?

I have not heard anybody suggest that.

Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.

Or spending increases.